The Long Cycle of Real Estate by Ronald W. Kaiser
Introduction
Nearly all studies found in current literature assume that the available data from
NCREIF are a fair representation of real estate returns, and that they encompass a full
real estate cycle. They certainly are the only institutional quality data available. Yet, by our
view, they only encompass the top portion of a very long cycle and therefore offer only a
very limited view of real estate performance.
This study will explore earlier studies of real estate returns, dating back as far as 1919.
In so doing, we will discover the possible existence of a very long (ﬁfty–sixty years) cycle
in real estate, where the boom/bust of 1920–34 exhibited many similarities to the
boom/bust of 1980–93 that we recently experienced. Both periods were initiated by an
unusually high period of inﬂation and rapidly rising rents. Perhaps the next period of
pervasively negative returns for equity real estate investments will not recur for some
time, at least not until inﬂation once again rises out of control.
Some Background on Real Estate Cycles
Most studies involving real estate cycles deﬁne them in terms of vacancy ﬂuctuations
around a long-term “equilibrium” line, and analyze the forces that cause new construc-
tion, the absorption of space, etc. A comprehensive study by Born and Pyhrr (1994)
summarized much of the property cycle literature to date and concluded that economic
cycles do impact real estate returns. Further, traditional appraisal practice is “trend
driven” and that resulting linear models in discounted cash ﬂow projections tend to
undervalue property in cycle troughs and to overvalue property near peaks. An entire
cycle was contained in the ten-year study period.
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Abstract. The experience of the 1985–1993 boom/bust in real estate has left industry
players nervous about when it might happen again. This study examines the possible causes
and the periodicity of such major real estate cycles. A search of the literature for return
evidence from this century suggests that there was only one other period of negative total
returns for national real estate—the late 1920s and early 1930s. The evidence suggests that
both periods of negative returns were caused by excessive levels of new construction,
induced by an unusual rise in NOI, which in turn was the result of an inﬂation spike in the
general level of prices. Evidence from even earlier periods suggests a periodicity for such
real estate boom/busts of some ﬁfty to sixty years. Perhaps the caution of today’s Federal
Reserve Board about containing inﬂation means that we will not likely see another
boom/bust period for real estate during the remainder of our careers.Mueller (1995) deﬁnes the relationships between the physical attributes (occupancy,
construction, etc.) and the ﬁnancial market cycle. Mueller and Laposa (1995) analyze
thirty-one metropolitan ofﬁce markets that have data running from 1967 to 1993,
concluding that there are four groups of cities with varying cycle length and amplitude,
but with the most common cycle length running 7.25 to 8 years. Most cycle studies focus
on cycles of this length, primarily because of data availability, and because the ability to
accurately forecast such cycles can lead to optimum property purchase and sale timing.
Indeed, we view the study of these shorter-term cycles as highly useful in the management of
real estate portfolios—in the timing of purchases and sales—but of very limited use in
deciding how much to allocate to the real estate asset class. We need to examine longer-
term returns to decide on the relative worth of real estate in institutional portfolios.
A few studies encompass a broader view of cycles, with Pyhrr and Roulac (1996)
arguing that some ﬁfteen different kinds of cycles (inﬂation, construction, business, social
change, technology, etc.) need to be considered in making truly intelligent market timing
forecasts. In their collection of “macro real estate cycles,” they include the Wenzlick 
18.3-year cycle (Rabinowitz, 1980) and several longer-period cycles (thirty year, ﬁfty–
sixty year, and several 100-year) described by Downs (1993). These longer cycles, we
believe, better explain the behavior of the real estate markets since 1980 than any of the
shorter term views.
The eighteen-year cycle ﬁrst started to appear in the work of Hoyt (1933) in which he
detailed one hundred years of land values, rents and various kinds of real estate activity
in Chicago. Wenzlick’s name became attached to the cycle because he regularly referred
to it in his Real Estate Analyst periodical in the 1950s and ’60s. However, it failed to
reappear in any convincing form for some time after the 1934 trough. Hoyt (1960) and
Rabinowitz (1980) developed arguments as to why the old periodicity was no longer
occurring.
In Hoyt’s 1960 study “The Urban Real Estate Cycle,” he concluded that “the weight of
the evidence seems to be against the recurrence of any sharp depression that will pull
down all real estate with it as it did in the past . . . . The real estate cycle may thus have
been a phase of a youthful . . . society . . . subject to few controls by national or local
governments, and which was the result of alternating moods of optimism and depression
of masses of people.” “It remains to be seen, of course, whether our mixed economy, with
its national and local controls, will eliminate the real estate cycle altogether, or whether it
will break out from the underground caves in which it may be hiding to assert itself again
with its old time violence.” Once the eighteen-year cycle became obscured by the post-
war boom, even the fathers of long-cycle theories came to believe that government
regulation could moderate the excesses of booms and busts that had previously occurred.
Not noted by most observers, however, was that every third cycle peak contained a
major boom/bust cycle: the early 1800s; the 1870s; the 1920s; and the late 1980s! If this is
so, perhaps the eighteen-year cycle still persists, but the one we would have expected in
the 1950s was postponed and distorted by the prolonged period of underdevelopment in
the 1930s and World War II. The resulting “catching up” period masked the normal
cyclicality. Perhaps the wash-out of mortgage REITs and the S&Ls in the 1973–74 period
indicated the cycle was back on track, and foreshadowed the speculative boom of the
1980s and the washout of the early 1990s.
In any case, perhaps what institutional investors experienced in the past decade was an
anomaly, not likely to be experienced again for another generation. The boom/bust of
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inﬂationary years of the teens and the 1970s led to dramatic rises in net operating income
in the ‘20s and ‘80s that then led to disastrous levels of overbuilding.
Return Data from Earlier Studies
What evidence can we ﬁnd that other decades were much more rewarding for real estate
investors than we experienced recently? Investment property does not enjoy as
comprehensive a database as stocks or bonds, but an extensive searching of the literature
has turned up some useful studies to ﬁll in the picture. Comprehensive studies by Sirmans
and Sirmans (1987) and Norman, Sirmans and Benjamin (1995) provide a thorough
perspective on the investment return data commonly available in the literature. However,
much of this work is limited to the most recent quarter-century, and is fairly well studied.
What was lacking is a longer term perspective. The few studies that attempted to extend
the data farther back in history either relied upon single-family home or farm data,
considered not directly relevant to institutional property investment, or were theoretical
constructs from other data, e.g., Fogler (1984) and Ibbotson and Siegel (1984) and were
not included here because the data were not based upon observed returns of investment
property. However, further digging into some of the dustier portions of libraries did turn
up some useful older studies of investment property returns.
Several of the studies chosen for this study were academically rigorous: Wendt (1953);
Grebler (1955); Case (1960). However, they each dealt with returns in one metro market:
San Francisco, New York and Los Angeles, respectively. Others were not as in-depth, but
still reasonable and thoughtful, and more broadly based geographically: Kelleher (1976)
and Miles; McCue (1984). These studies, plus data from PRISA (the Prudential Realty
Institutional Separate Account), the First National Bank of Chicago real estate fund,
and the early data compiled by the Frank Russell Company for commingled real estate
equity funds, all provide pieces that combine to give an impression of returns from earlier
periods.
The data in Exhibit 1 has been arranged around the major stages of the ﬁfty-to-sixty-
year long-term real estate cycle that we mentioned earlier and will describe in more detail
later. Notes about the various studies’ methodologies and our compilation or
recalculation of returns are contained in numbered footnotes. The annual data behind
these compound period returns in Exhibit 1 are found in the Appendix.
In the comparative data of Exhibit 1, the superior performing asset for each period has
its return highlighted in bold type. (Where the returns are within a factor of 0.9–1.1 times
each other, both are highlighted.) Not surprisingly (to seasoned real estate professionals),
common stocks and real estate have a similarly frequent distribution of superiority. The
boldface type is about equally distributed between the real estate returns and stock
returns. Bonds are worse. Only during the boom/bust cycle of the late ‘20s or late ‘80s do
bonds emerge as a superior asset class.
We should note that it is difﬁcult to be academically rigorous in drawing any
conclusions from the return data in Exhibit 1. Demanding statisticians will point out that
we are comparing small sample property studies with broad market indices for stocks and
bonds. Yet, when all the studies are plotted on one chart (Exhibit 2), one can see the
pattern of a long period of consistently good returns between the 1930s and 1990s trough
periods, with a brief period of exceptional returns prior to each trough. In the 1920s the
THE LONG CYCLE IN REAL ESTATE 235236 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
VOLUME 14, NUMBER 3, 1997
Exhibit 1
Compound Annual Total Returns
for Various Property Types, Geographies and Time Periods
Annual Total Returns
Period Covered Annual Return Stocks Bonds
Prior Boom/Bust Cycle 1920–1934
Grebler1
NY Apartments 1923–30 13.4% 11.7% 4.9
1923–40 4.4 6.1 5.0
1923–50 4.9 8.6 4.2
NY Lofts 1923–30 10.9 11.7 4.9
1923–40 1.0 6.1 5.0
1923–50 4.7 8.6 4.2
NY Apartments 1928–40 (0.4) 1.3 4.5
1928–50 2.9 6.4 3.7
NY Lofts 1928–40 (2.2) 1.3 4.5
1928–50 1.6 6.4 3.7
Wendt2
SF CBD Ofﬁce/retail 1919–27 10.6 12.7 5.0
1928–34 (2.3) (3.5) 4.0
Between the Cycle Peaks 1935–1980
Wendt
SF Central Business
District (CBD) Ofﬁce/retail 1935–45 4.9% 11.5% 4.5%
1946–51 9.9 12.9 0.5 
Case3
LA Diversiﬁed 1935–39 2.6 10.9 4.8
1940–44 17.0 7.7 3.0
1945–49 13.6 10.7 3.5
1950–53 17.4 17.6 0.2
Kelleher4
Diversiﬁed Multi-
tenant, nationwide 1961–73 13.2 7.4 2.6
Hodges5
Apartments and ofﬁces,
Washington, D.C. 1966–70 9.0 3.4 0.3
PRISA6
Ofﬁce and industrial,
nationwide 1973–82 12.9 6.6 6.3
FNBC7
Ofﬁce and industrial,
nationwide 1975–82 11.2 14.9 7.3
Miles and McCue8
Apartments, nationwide 1974–81 15.5 17.9 3.2
Industrial, nationwide 1974–81 16.2 17.9 3.2
Ofﬁce, nationwide 1974–81 15.0 17.9 3.2
Retail, nationwide 1974–81 11.5 17.9 3.2
Recent Boom/Bust Cycle 1980–1993
NCREIF9 Index 1984–93 3.9 14.9 14.3
Apartments 1988–93 5.1
Ofﬁce 1984–93 0.0 14.9 14.3
R&D 1984–93 3.9 14.9 14.3
Retail 1984–93 8.0 14.9 14.3
Warehouse 1984–93 5.9 14.9 14.3THE LONG CYCLE IN REAL ESTATE 237
Exhibit 1 (continued)
Recovery to the Next Cycle Peak (around 2040–45?)
NCREIF Index 1994–95 7.8 18.0 9.9
Apartments 1994–95 12.2 18.0 9.9
Ofﬁce 1994–95 5.8 18.0 9.9
R&D Properties 1994–95 8.2 18.0 9.9
Retail 1994–95 5.5 18.0 9.9
Warehouse 1994–95 11.2 18.0 9.9
1Grebler (1955) studied the records of 581 properties in New York City that had at least twenty years
of operating records. Apartments are an equal mix of walk-ups and elevator, with rent control being
a factor from 1942–50. Lofts are typically two–three story business structures, with ofﬁces or stores
downstairs and open ofﬁce, warehouse, or light manufacturing upstairs. Grebler calculated his own
internal rates of return, which we were able to conﬁrm in some cases by the data provided in the
study. Returns are based upon purchases grouped into ﬁve-year periods (1920–24 and 1925–29),
unleveraged, with resales based upon adjusted assessed values (adjusted to market by the ratio of
actual price to assessed value) for a sample of thirteen apartments and fourteen lofts.
2Wendt (1953), primarily a study of annual operations, provided detailed data for thirty-nine proper-
ties in downtown San Francisco, all commercial buildings, primarily ofﬁce but often with retail or
restaurant on the lower ﬂoors. From these he constructed a net operating income index for each
ﬁve years. Using this data, plus actual purchase and sales prices for twelve properties in the sample
(several transactions on some), we calculated the total returns shown. The other twenty-seven
properties were not included because only listing prices, owners’ opinions, or uncertain appraisals
were available as sale proxies.
3Case (1960), primarily a study of annual operations, reviewed the records of all properties that had
at least ten years of operating data in the City of Los Angeles: ﬁfty-seven apartment buildings,
thirty-seven commercial properties, and fourteen mixed-use properties. We calculated the total
returns shown by applying the capitalization rates calculated for each period to determine price
changes, and combined this with the net operating income ﬁgures to obtain the total returns.
4Kelleher (1976), was an ofﬁcer of the Dain Corporation in Minneapolis, real estate investment
managers and investment consultants. That company collected net operating income data on
“many seasoned rental properties across the nation and is constantly updated. The data are used
to construct a Net Operating Income Index for Multiple-Tenant Real Estate.” Capitalizing this data
with the “prevalent rate of capitalization . . . used by large insurance companies” produced an
annual return index for seasoned investment properties. Over the period of the study, cap rates rose
from 8.9% to 9.5%, so all of the price appreciation had to come from the rise in the Net Operating
Income Index from 77.6 to 140.1.
5Hodges (1971), surveyed seventeen apartment and commercial ofﬁce property sales in the
Washington, D.C. area , between July 1966 and June 1970 and found total returns concentrated
around the 9% level.
6Prudential Realty’s commingled real estate fund, the industry leader (in size) for institutional
investment in the 1970s. Founded in 1970, it grew to over $5 billion in total assets by 1984, heavily
oriented to ofﬁce and industrial property in the 1970s. Returns are calculated in similar fashion to
NCREIF, based heavily upon annual appraisal values.
7First National Bank of Chicago’s commingled, unleveraged, real estate fund, smaller than PRISA,
with returns reweighted by Ibbotson (1984) to reduce geographic imbalance: equal-weight regional
portfolios were calculated for north, south, east, and west regions, then combined by weighting to
reﬂect relative census populations in each region.
8Miles and McCue (1984) studied the component returns of a large commingled fund (either
Prudential’s or Equitable’s, by virtue of its size), and developed these ﬁgures from a fund that had
113 properties in the beginning and over 300 at the end of the study, diversiﬁed into 51% ofﬁce, 28%
industrial, 17% retail, 3% apartment, and 2% motel.
9The National Commingled Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries (NCREIF) Index, formerly called
Frank Russell Company Index (FRC), tracks the annual returns of thousands of unleveraged
properties in institutional portfolios, using annual appraised valuations except when there is a
purchase or sale and actual prices are used. As of mid-1988, this index was 58% in ofﬁces or R&D
properties, 22% in retail properties, 15% warehouses, 4% apartments, and 2% hotels.effect of having only compound annualized data for ﬁve-to-eight-year periods probably
smoothes over and hides the peak return years that anecdotal evidence and the NOI
chart in Exhibit 3 indicates likely occurred around 1927. By way of comparison, if the
NCREIF returns for 1977 through 1985 were annualized, the resulting 4.1% ﬁgure would
“hide” the peak return years of 18% and 21%. It is still not a cleanly continuous picture,
but it does rough justice to portraying the behavior of real estate returns in this century.
It shows:
• good returns in the 1920s (possibly with some very high return years not discernible
from the available data);
• weak to negative returns from the late1920s into the 1930s;
• moderate to high returns from the 1930s into the 1970s;
• high double-digit returns in the late 1970s and into the 1980s;
• weak to negative returns in the early 1990s;
• moderate returns in the mid-1990s.
Construction Booms Are Rent Driven
What other information can we glean about the earlier boom/bust period? In addition to
the return data available from historic studies, three studies contained details of net
operating income trends: Grebler (1955) for New York City commercial property and
apartments; Hoyt (1933) for Chicago Central Business District (CBD) ofﬁce buildings;
and Case (1960) for Los Angeles commercial property and apartments. These data,
converted to index values and plotted in Exhibit 3, offer a clear picture of the economic
238 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
VOLUME 14, NUMBER 3, 1997
Exhibit 2

























































































Net Operating Income (NOI) Index,
the 1980s Operating Income Boom
Source: FRC Property Index 1978–1981, NCREIF NPI Index 1982–1993 (Income Components); the
NCREIF Index includes leveraged properties.
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Exhibit 3
Net Operating Income (NOI) Index,
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4motivation for the capital markets to create a building boom in the 1920s. How big was
the boom? Exhibit 4 plots the total value of new construction in constant 1929 dollars,
and shows a doubling in construction levels at the 1925–26 peaks. (It is interesting to note
that the Empire State Building began construction in 1927.)
In Exhibit 3A we created an NOI Index (similar to those in Exhibit 3) for the NCREIF
Index and for NCREIF ofﬁce data by stripping out the price change in these series. The
resulting rise and fall of the net income echoes the patterns of Exhibit 3, but without the
extremes of some individual cities, since Exhibit 3A plots only national averages.
Also illustrative is a comparison of the construction booms in this century normalized
for population growth. Arbour (1993) calculated the real value of commercial con-
struction in this century, and divided it by total ﬁnance, insurance and real estate
employment (the traditional census employment data used to evaluate ofﬁce markets).
His ﬁndings, plotted in Exhibit 5, were that both the 1920s and the 1980s had several
years of new development in excess of $2000 per employee, levels not reached in any other
year of this century! And both periods resulted in occupancy problems (with the 1930s
made worse by the Fed’s contraction of the money supply and the worsening economic
depression). The boom/bust of yesterday was not that different from our modern
experience.1
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Exhibit 4
Total Expenditures for New Construction in 
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In searching for an explanation of the cause of each boom, we ﬁnd a period of general
price inﬂation preceding and accompanying a rapid rise in property rents. Referring to
Exhibit 6, we see that the boom/bust of the 1920s came just after the inﬂation spike of
1918–20, and the recent boom/bust was preceded by the high inﬂation of 1973–81.
Because scaling difﬁculties obscure the most recent inﬂation peak, we have isolated it in
Exhibit 7, where the inﬂation (and interest rate) pressure clearly peaked and began to
subside with Fed Chairman Volker’s resolve to control the growth in the money supply
beginning in 1981.
Along with the inﬂation peaks in both periods, we see a peak in long-term interest
rates, as market forces sought to maintain a real rate of return margin for such
investments. Also, immediately following both inﬂation peaks, the early reaction in real
estate was a period of strongly improving net operating income and property value
increases. In our view, these periods of boom and deterioration occur as a chain-reaction of
events set in motion by a prior period of above-average inﬂation. 
Industry experience indicates that the initial response to unexpected inﬂation is that
rents rise faster than expenses. Expenses are often contractually ﬁxed or rise in lagged
step-function (such as taxes, insurance and utility rates) while asking rents can be moved
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Exhibit 5
Commercial Construction per Trade/FIRE Employment 
versus Ofﬁce Occupancy*
*Construction is adjusted by using the Marshall & Swift building cost index for eastern steel
frame ofﬁce buildings.



































































































































Real Estate Construction per Employee Occupancyas quickly as the markets will allow. The result is a rise in net income that is faster than
the rise in general inﬂation in the early years.
Next, the sources of investment capital take note of the improving income returns and
begin to pay more for properties, moving prices up and attracting even more capital.
Eventually, prices move above replacement cost, making it proﬁtable to invest in new
development. However, the time lags involved in the planning, design, ﬁnancing, and
construction of new projects is on the order of years, resulting in a prolonged rise in NOI
before new capacity begins to provide competition, and a continuation of the
construction boom lasting beyond the point where vacancies have begun to drive rents
back down. Exhibit 5 shows the magnitude of the capital-driven investment booms in
both eras.
As the new supply of space outstripped the demand, rents softened and vacancy costs
rose. As a result, NOI peaked between 1927 and 1930. The ensuing depression, of course,
made things worse for a while, though there was always positive NOI for the markets as
a whole. This looks surprisingly similar to the story of the 1980s, when rising rents and
NOI brought in a ﬂood of new capital and new construction.
Even so, with only two such major boom/bust cycles in this century, it could be argued
that such a sequence of inﬂation-NOI rise-construction boom/bust was just fortuitous.
However, later we shall see some evidence of a possibly similar boom/bust in the 1870s,
following on the heels of the Civil War inﬂation spike, indicating there may well be a ﬁfty-
to-sixty-year periodicity to these major real estate events.
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Exhibit 6




























































































































The Recent Experience of Long-Term Rates and Wholesale-Level Inﬂation


























































































Wholesale Price Index Long-Term Interest Rates Real Estate Income ReturnFarmland Prices May Be An Early Indicator of a Peak
As a ﬁnal conﬁrming indicator of an impending boom/bust for commercial real estate, we
see an early peak in farmland prices—in 1920 and in 1982—followed by a prolonged
period of decline. Farmland acreage prices seem to closely track wholesale prices,
reﬂecting the fact that farm incomes are heavily inﬂuenced by, and respond quickly to,
the rise and fall in commodity prices. Yet, the farmland peak precedes the general real
estate boom/bust cycle by a number of years. The normal time lags in instituting property
rent increases and in new construction result in years of delay in the urban property peak
versus farmland.
The Five Inﬂation Peaks in American History
In addition to the two inﬂation cycle peaks in this century, we ﬁnd three others in
American history (1780, 1814 and 1864) as shown in Exhibit 8. In the most recent three
cycles, we see the peak in long bond yields coinciding with wholesale prices, while the CPI
Rent Index lags the peak by six-to-ten years.
While there is almost no real estate return data available for the earlier cycles, we do ﬁnd
in Hoyt (1933) that Chicago land values peaked in 1869 at 60% above trend and troughed
in 1878 at 50% below trend. A boom/bust of this magnitude did not recur in Chicago until
1925 (+65%) and 1933 (240%). Also, in Exhibit 9 we offer a chart of foreclosure rates for
three cities and ﬁnd the largest peaks occurring in the down cycle of the 1870s and 1930s.
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Exhibit 8
250 Years of the Long Cycle of Inﬂation in the U.S.


















































































1Although Exhibit 9 deals with single-family homes—not the investment property covered
in this study—we believe the concurrence of housing market weakness in the ’80’s with the
ofﬁce and other markets indicates that the underlying forces in all real estate markets may
be similar in their effect and their broad timing, not withstanding the fact that local
market peaks and troughs may vary by several years from each other.
Possible Explanations for the Cycle Length
What might account for the length of these long cycles? The ﬁrst one was thirty-four
years peak to peak, the next two ﬁfty and ﬁfty-six years, and the last one was about sixty-
two years. Three possible answers are offered by Ayres (1990), Forrester (1976) and
Kaiser (1979). Ayres speculated that clusters of innovations (technological transfor-
mations) fostered the long-wave cycle. Forrester modeled the lead/lag relationships in the
capital equipment and consumer durables sectors of the economy and found that ﬁfty
years was the amount of time needed to develop cycle peaks of excess capacity and cycle
troughs of deferred investment.
Kaiser investigated the sociopolitical changes that occur through different portions of
the cycle and hypothesized that “each individual is deeply affected by the state of the
economy during his or her adolescent and early business years. Thus, a person’s inﬂuence
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Exhibit 9
Foreclosure Rates for Manhattan, Philadelphia and 













































305.1on the economy, whether as a businessman, laborer, consumer, banker, voter, or elected
representative, is a lifelong reﬂection of this early experience.” Different generations take
on a more optimistic and aggressive or pessimistic and conservative approach to business
depending upon their personal experience. For example, the Federal Reserve Board of the
1950s and 1960s was focused primarily on avoiding unemployment (to avoid another
depression) and was willing to exponentially expand the money supply. Today’s Fed is
just the opposite—willing to accept some unemployment in order to prevent any
recurrence of inﬂation. Thus, it takes about two generations (or so) to let the lessons from
our elders become a little “old fashioned” and lead the new generation into repeating the
cycle. Perhaps as people live longer, the cycle has lengthened out.
Interestingly, the 18.3-year real estate cycle that was so actively referred to in
Rabinowitz (1980), and Roy Wenzlick’s periodical of the 1950s–1970s, the Real Estate
Analyst, may play a part in breaking the long cycle into three subcycles. In Exhibit 10 we
reproduce Wenzlick’s real estate “activity” chart (which plots the number of voluntary
transfers and is primarily a chart of residential cycles) and superimposed on this is the
idealized 18.3-year immediate cycle. Every third cycle would correspond to the long-cycle
boom/bust of the 1870s, the 1920s and the 1980s.
This classic 18-year real estate cycle temporarily disappeared in the 1950s and 60’s,
probably due to the prolonged period of rebuilding necessary to overcome the effects of
the Great Depression and World War II. It probably reappeared in the form of the
mortgage REIT debacle of 1973–75 and in the general overbuilding boom/bust of the
1985–93 period. In Exhibit 11 we have listed all the real estate booms and busts we could
glean from Hoyt (1933), McMahan (1976), Rabinowitz (1980), and Sakolski (1932),
grouping them by the actual 18.3-year cycle dates from Wenzlick’s work.
In Exhibit 11 we also have highlighted the Wenzlick cycle that contains the major cycle
peak in bold. While the picture seems to hold up fairly well for the most recent three
cycles, it certainly is muddy prior to 1825. Whether that is a function of the lack of data
or of the pre-urban youth of the country (when different cities’ early growth was a result
more of population migration than of an over-riding economic cycle).
Finally, we have included Homer Hoyt’s 1933 chart of the Chicago real estate cycle as
Exhibit 12, perhaps the best graphical evidence of the long cycles that we have in the
literature.
Current Position in the Long Cycle: Near the Beginning for Real Estate
The conclusion seems to be that we are probably ﬁfty years away from experiencing the
kind of boom/bust pain that real estate went through in the last ten years.2
• Although the causes remain unclear, inﬂationary forces have peaked every
ﬁfty–sixty years in the past. Given the continued fear of inﬂation by the capital
markets and the Fed’s steady hand on the money supply, we expect the next
inﬂation peak to perhaps be that far away again.
• These inﬂationary forces boost real estate incomes and encourage excessive,
destabilizing ﬂows of capital into real estate development, resulting in a major
boom/bust period for real estate. Investment opportunities are heightened in the
years following such periods.
• Farmland prices, due to their sensitivity to commodity price levels, have historic-
ally been the ﬁrst property type to decline following the peak in inﬂation—
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Exhibit 11
Real Estate Booms and Busts in U.S. History
18.3–Year Cycle
Trough Peak
1795 1760–95: Wild land manias (Ohio, New York, Georgia
“Yazoo” Territory)
1795–1805: Connecticut Gore Land Company crash
1791–95: Washington D.C. land boom and 1796 bust
1805 1814 None found
1825 1835 1832–37: Chicago real estate boom and panic of 1837
1834: Speculation from Maine to the Red River
1837: Sales of public lands peaked at ten times the level of the
previous ten years
1845 1851 1848–54: California Gold Rush land boom and 1854 crash
1861 1872 1869–72: Major peak and crash in Chicago land values
1862–73: Railroad land boom in the West, bankruptcy of Northern
Paciﬁc in 1973
1878 1888 So. California real estate boom and crash of 1887 (60% of newly
created lots disappear)
1891–92: Peak and decline in Chicago land prices
1897 1904 None found
1918 1925 Florida land boom and 1926 crash
1925: Major peak in Chicago land prices
1927: Empire State Building begun, called “Empty State
Building” in 1931
1933 1946 1933–35: Home Owners Loan Corp. (Federal agency) takes 
over 200,000+ mortgages, recovers 92% of original capital by
1951
1962? 1973? 1950s syndication boom and 1962 bust (along with most 
listed real estate stocks—Glickman Corp. down 54%)
1969–71: Rise of REITs (130 formed), followed by defaults of
mortgage REITs and NAREIT 1973–74 decline of 83%
1975 1989? 1980s ofﬁce building boom, single-family home speculation
(especially in California)
1990–92: NCREIF wash-outimmediately following the peak in inﬂation, and years ahead of the other
property types. As such, farmland prices have served as an informal early
warning signal of an impending boom/bust for the general property markets.
Currently, farmland prices are again on the rise.
• Each long cycle appears to be composed of three eighteen-year Wenzlick cycles,
each of which can end in a brief period of instability and reduced returns for real
estate.
Assuming these cycle lengths repeat, with the last real estate boom/bust period
peaking during the years 1985–90, we will not likely see the next eighteen-year cycle
correction until after 2003–2008. Patient investors with capital to place in the middle of
the next decade might prudently wait until the cycle correction presents a new wave of
buying opportunities, but for the next ﬁve to ten years, real estate should continue to offer
outstanding return opportunities without fear of signiﬁcant risks. (Obviously, investors who
are sensitive to the supply/demand variations by property type and by geography can
improve on the general risk/return trends.)
This also means that the next major boom/bust period for real estate is probably not
going to occur until 2040–50, when our grandchildren will have no personal experience of
the 1980s, and will think of the older generations as excessively conservative, much as the
players in the 1980s thought of the older generation’s cautiousness stemming from their
1930s’ experience as irrelevant for their lives. If these major cycles persist for those of us in
the real estate industry today, the environment for real estate investing will likely be more
rewarding than risky for the balance of our careers.
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Exhibit 12
The Chicago Real Estate Cycle
Source: Hoyt (1933)
Land Value: 1=$ 5,000,000 Transfers: 1=$ 1,000
New Buildings: 1=$ 200,000 Lots Subdivided: 1=$ 200




















































































































































5Some Possible Implications of a Long Cycle
There are a number of possible effects that could result from a long-cycle framework for
the real estate investment profession.
A Recasting of Some of the Research Done to Date. If the data of the past twenty years
represent the abnormal conditions of a boom/bust cycle peak, then the conclusions
derived from this data are not likely to be applicable to the conditions we will experience
in the next twenty or thirty years. Such studies may have to be recast as unrepresentative
of more normal operating conditions. There is much to be learned about how long cycles
are inﬂuenced by variations in the short cycles.
Reduced Volatility of Real Estate Returns in the Years Ahead. Real estate returns are
generally more stable (non-negative) in the years between the booms and busts. Thus,
asset allocation models based upon the boom/bust period will have to be adjusted to the
calmer conditions in the more disciplined market environment in the immediate future, in
order to make a more accurate allocation decision.
Major Asset Allocation Shifts. The data from Exhibit 1 appear to point to a long-term
return trend of 10%–11% for real estate, very similar to what the domestic stock market
has produced over the long term. If this is true, then institutional investors can achieve
their return targets with either asset, so the trade-off becomes simply one of choosing
between the illiquidity of real estate and the volatility of stocks. Depending on investor
preferences, the current pension fund allocation of 40%–60% in domestic stocks and
3%–5% in real estate could become signiﬁcantly more equal.
Ideas for Future Research. The work in this study represents only the beginnings of
possible research into the long cycle. There are likely to be other data, from other metro
areas, from other years, that can help ﬁll in the picture, particularly the data gap in the
1950s. Work can also be done to discover the possibility of similar long cycles in other
countries, since the inﬂation peaks in U.S. history are known to be closely correlated to
similar peaks in Europe and elsewhere.
Effects on Professional Careers. The anticipation of long-cycle impacts requires almost
super-human patience to live through. Our early work on the long cycle led us to
conclude that the real estate market was showing signs of a boom/bust in 1978. As a
result, we began cutting our allocation for global portfolios, winding down to only one-
third of former levels by the mid-1980s, but the real estate bull market would not stop! It
became increasingly difﬁcult to keep calling for a bust that would not come.
Some professional peers as well as some clients would not take us seriously. Some may
not see much value in anticipating the boom/bust up to ten years ahead of the fact, but
the magnitude of the event was so overwhelming, it was eventually quite gratifying to live
through the crash with far less damage than would otherwise have been the case, and to
have cash to re-enter the market in the early 1990s. Conversely, many institutional
investors who did not anticipate the boom/bust were so scarred by the experience that
they have still not mustered the commitment from their boards to begin investing again
in the private property market. Even for those who come to believe there may again be a
period of boom/bust for real estate (once another inﬂation spike occurs), industry peer
pressure will be a difﬁcult thing to act against. It is likely that most real estate
professionals will ﬁnd it too risky for their careers to be very far from the herd, and are
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secure in the knowledge that “at least everyone else got hurt, too.”
Knowledge of the Cycle May Alter It. Should enough people accept the existence of major
cycles, and attempt to anticipate them, their collective actions could severely alter the
magnitude or duration of the cycles, thereby making us all look foolish, much as the
stock market does to most of its participants.
A Simpliﬁed View of the Long-Cycle Return Trend
There is no NCREIF National Property Index  (NPI) prior to 1978, yet we have strong
evidence of a long-cycle trend to real estate investment returns though the studies are
generally localized and highly variable. In an attempt to simplify the historic view, we
have constructed a synthetic style band of real estate returns from the period since 1919
by simply estimating a narrow range from the return studies in Exhibit 1. It is our view of
where national real estate returns were likely to have been, using a four-to-six-percentage-
point bandwidth and should not be interpreted as necessarily reﬂecting a true national
portfolio. In Exhibit 13, we show this simpliﬁed long-cycle view, with farmland values
superimposed, showing the decline in farmland leading the real estate troughs by several
years. In Exhibit 14, we show the same real estate return trend with annual stock market
returns superimposed.
While stocks show a much more volatile return pattern, we know that the annual
compounded return (IRR) over the whole period is about 10.5%. Out of curiosity, we
calculated the IRR of the midpoint of the real estate band and found a result of 9.25%
for the entire seventy-eight years. Since this included two long-cycle troughs, we also
calculated the IRR for the past sixty years (1937–96), and found a result of 10.0%. While
these are not scientiﬁc results, they do point to a conclusion that, over the long run,
equity real estate returns are similar to the returns obtainable in the stock market. They
are indeed both equity investments. Investors, then, must choose between the volatility
risk in the stock market, and the illiquidity risk in real estate. Over the long run, the
returns are not likely to be all that different. 
Conclusion
Prior to the 1970s, when reasonably good quality data on private real estate markets
began to be available, it is probably impossible to perform any cycle analyses with the
kind of mathematical rigor that is now the hallmark of good ﬁnancial research. Yet, there
is some quantitative local-market evidence, as well as anecdotal evidence, to suggest that
the nationwide spread of negative total returns of the 1990s was a phenomenon that had
not occurred since the 1929–34 period, and before that, since the 1870s.
Further research into these boom/bust periods indicates some striking similarities.
• Prior to the boom, there is an unusually large spike in the general level of
inﬂation.
• Inﬂation triggers an initially rapid rise in net operating income.
• Rising incomes and rising prices attract an unusually large amount of
investment capital, resulting in a disastrously large overdevelopment boom.
• Resulting vacancy problems drive net operating incomes back down to levels
approximating those prior to the boom.
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Exhibit 14
Interpreted Trend of Real Estate Returns vs.
S&P 500 Returns 1926–1996
Exhibit 13













































































































































s• The drop in prices necessitated by the lower incomes is so large that it
overwhelms the positive income returns, resulting in negative total returns
for a few years.
In between these boom/bust periods, there are cycles of lesser magnitude, where total
returns to unlevered property portfolios remain positive.
The implications of such a long cycle (ﬁfty to sixty years) in real estate are to
profoundly question the immediate relevance of much of the research on NCREIF data to
date, should the real estate cycles of the next few decades return to the less volatile patterns
of the 1950s, ’60s, and ’70s. Also, asset allocation decisions by investors for, or against, real
estate should perhaps be framed in this longer view, rather than being so dramatically
impacted by the recent boom/bust, an experience that may not occur again in our lifetime.
Appendix A
Data Tables for Annual Returns Used in This Paper
This Appendix contains all of the annual return data used to compile the annual compound
returns for the periods shown in Exhibit 1. Where ﬁgures are repeated for several years, this is the





LA3 S2 NY Lofts NY Apts. NY Lofts NY Apts. Stocksa Bondsb
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
1919 11.7 -3.36 -0.78
1920 11.7 -7.91 8.81
1921 11.7 29.08 16.01
1922 11.7 7.70 5.08
1923 9.7 10.9 13.4 11.54 9.49
1924 9.7 10.9 13.4 29.07 8.29
1925 9.7 10.9 13.4 18.10 7.25
1926 9.7 10.9 13.4 11.61 7.77
1927 9.7 10.9 13.4 37.48 8.94
1928 -0.6 10.9 13.4 -2.2 -0.4 43.61 0.08
1929 -0.6 10.9 13.4 -2.2 -0.4 -8.41 3.42
1930 -0.6 10.9 13.4 -2.2 -0.4 -24.90 4.65
1931 -3.5 -2.2 -0.4 -43.35 -5.32
1932 -3.5 -2.2 -0.4 -8.20 16.84
1933 -3.5 -2.2 -0.4 53.97 -0.07
1934 -3.5 -2.2 -0.4 -1.42 10.02
1935 4.3 -2.2 -0.4 47.66 5.00
1936 12.4 4.3 -2.2 -0.4 33.92 7.50
1937 12.4 4.3 -2.2 -0.4 -35.02 0.22
1938 12.4 4.5 -2.2 -0.4 31.14 5.51
1939 12.4 4.5 -2.2 -0.4 -0.42 5.95
1940 12.4 4.5 -2.2 -0.4 -9.78 6.09
1,2,3Refer to the footnotes of the same numbers for Exhibit 1.
aStock market returns are Ibbotson’s large stock returns for 1926–95. For 1919–25, we used the
Standard and Poor’s Stock Index annual price change and added to this the Cowles dividend yield
for each year to obtain a total annual return.
bBond returns are Ibbotson’s long-term Treasury returns for 1926–95. For 1919–25, we used the
BEA statistics for long-term Treasury price change plus the annual interest yield for each year.
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Real Estate
Case: LA3 Wendt: SF2 Stocksa Bondsb
(%) (%) (%) (%)
1941 17.00 5.60 -11.58 0.93
1942 17.00 5.60 20.33 3.22
1943 17.00 5.60 25.91 2.07
1944 17.00 5.60 19.73 2.82
1945 17.00 5.60 36.41 10.73
1946 13.60 9.20 -8.07 -0.09
1947 13.60 9.20 5.70 -2.63
1948 13.60 9.20 5.51 3.39
1949 13.60 10.70 18.79 6.44
1950 17.40 10.70 31.74 0.05
1951 17.40 10.70 24.02 -3.94
1952 17.40 18.35 1.16








2,3Refer to the footnotes of the same numbers for Exhibit 1.
aStock market returns are Ibbotson’s large stock returns for 1926–95. For 1919–25, we used the
Standard and Poor’s Stock Index annual price change and added to this the Cowles dividend yield
for each year to obtain a total annual return.
bBond returns are Ibbotson’s long-term Treasury returns for 1926–95. For 1919–25, we used the




Miles and McCue8 Hodges 71–7710
FNBC Wash. NCREIF
PRISA6 (CREF)7 Off. Retail Res. Indus. DC5 789 Kelleher4 Stocksa Bondsb
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
1961 19.4 26.89 0.96
1962 6.2 -8.73 6.88
1963 12.0 22.78 1.21
1964 22.3 16.51 3.51
1965 10.8 12.38 0.70
1966 9.0 10.7 -10.07 3.65
1967 9.0 8.5 23.98 -9.19
1968 9.0 7.7 11.03 -0.26
1969 9.0 10.4 -8.42 -5.07
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1970 9.0 7.8 3.98 14.00
1971 9.2 18.2 14.30 13.24
1972 7.5 22.8 18.95 5.67
1973 9.2 7.5 16.7 -14.78 0.88
1974 8.9 8.9 6.1 7.9 9.4 7.2 -26.45 3.36
1975 8.2 6.6 8.2 5.9 1.8 12.1 5.7 37.30 9.08
1976 8.5 8.6 10.4 1.2 4.5 7.9 9.3 23.70 17.44
1977 10.7 8.7 9.2 11.1 13.3 11.8 10.5 -7.26 1.30
1978 19.5 14.7 13.2 9.7 13.9 14.8 16.03 6.57 -1.11
1979 24.0 14.7 22.0 25.8 26.8 24.0 20.73 18.60 -0.87
1980 22.0 12.9 28.7 12.1 18.1 27.4 18.09 32.13 -2.96
1981 15.7 13.5 21.5 12.2 14.3 24.2 16.62 -4.91 0.48
1982 4.4 10.4 9.43 21.11 42.08
1983 13.33 22.37 2.23
1984 13.04 6.11 14.81
1985 10.11 32.03 31.53
1986 6.64 18.55 24.08
1987 5.48 5.22 -2.67
1988 7.04 16.82 9.23
1989 6.22 31.53 19.05
1990 1.46 -3.18 6.27
1991 -6.07 30.57 18.70
1992 -4.34 7.69 8.09
1993 0.57 9.99 17.44
1994 6.75 1.29 -7.73
1995 8.83 37.48 30.90
4,5,6,7,8,9Refers to the footnotes of the same numbers for Exhibit 1.
10FRC Data for Commingled Funds, JMB (1978)
Exhibit A4
NCREIF Ofﬁce Warehouse Retail Apartment
1980 18.09 25.99 16.15 12.78
1981 16.62 20.23 15.18 11.03
1982 9.43 9.86 9.00 7.02
1983 13.33 12.28 10.80 15.09
1984 13.04 12.07 12.38 16.23
1985 10.11 8.93 12.54 11.90
1986 6.64 4.35 8.67 11.50
1987 5.48 0.93 11.43 11.56
1988 7.04 3.05 10.05 13.39 7.37
1989 6.22 3.57 9.87 10.54 5.91
1990 1.46 -2.73 2.36 6.14 5.79
1991 -6.07 -11.68 -1.84 -2.31 -2.36
1992 -4.34 -9.27 -2.83 -2.55 3.41
1993 0.57 -2.48 -2.38 5.64 11.07
1994 6.75 4.26 8.95 5.29 13.18
1995 8.83 7.20 13.17 5.47 11.82
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1The nearly perfect timing coincidence between the three cities in the 1920s may not be
representative of normal experience. In the 1980–1993 boom/bust, the crash rolled from the Oil Belt
(including Denver) in 1984–87, to Arizona in 1988–89, to New England, New York and the Mid-
Atlantic in 1989–92, ﬁnally ending in California 1990–93.
2It is also possible that the cycle of “pain” timing will vary by property type. The boom/bust of the
’90s was felt most heavily in the ofﬁce sector. The retail sector, with its rapid build-up of big box
retailing, outlet malls, etc., may only be just now having its boom/bust.
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